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# The Relevance of Comparative Politics to the Study of Comparative Administration

*Students of comparative administration can find useful research tools in the growing methodological literature of comparative politics. After reviewing the development of the study of comparative politics, the article examines two main types of conceptual models: "general system" models, which attempt conceptualization for all societies, and "political culture" schemes, which assume that a classification of political systems must precede the development of dimensions for comparison. Several other comparative tools are also examined. The article concludes that both models will prove useful for comparative administration, but that political culture models, being more closely related to the various classes of political systems, can more easily be made operational.*[1]

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STUDENTS of comparative public administration can find in comparative politics a considerable body of substantive materials directly related to their own concerns, as well as increasingly sophisticated and self-conscious efforts at methodological clarification. This division between methodological and substantive

[1]The author would like to thank his colleague at Gainesville, Alfred Clubok, for helping him clarify his ideas and shape his conclusions. The responsibility for the present form of these ideas and conclusions is, of course, his own.

contributions is to some extent arbitrary and artificial. Students of comparative politics, by focusing on certain data or problems, are led to a particular method for handling these data. Thus they contribute not only a substantive body of information but, in some cases, also a distinct methodology.[2] On the other hand, those concerned only with questions of method nevertheless approach this problem from a certain body of empirical data, and thereby can give us insight into some political systems.[3] Too often, unfortunately, substantive studies are marred by the lack of ordered presentation of data, while methodological efforts seem to be totally unrelated to the problems of empirical research.

Although one might easily despair at bringing about a union of theory, comparative method, and empirical research in political science, one must nevertheless assume that there is an indissoluble connection between them and that what Durkheim said about sociology applies to politics as well: "Comparative sociology is not a separate branch of sociology; it is sociology itself, to the extent that it is more than merely descriptive, and hopes to account for facts as well."[4] If comparison is essential, no matter what our concept of the study of politics—whether descriptive, theoretical, or predictive[5]—the question is: what is it we hope to do by making comparisons? Macridis has put it succinctly thus: "To give us an explanatory frame of reference in terms of which we can account for differences and uniformities...is the central problem of comparative analysis."[6] This value-free approach to comparative studies

[2]A good example of this is Brian Chapman, *The Profession of Government: The Public Service in Europe* (New York, 1959).

[3]David Apter, A Comparative Method for the Study of Politics, *American Journal of Sociology*, 9 (Nov. 1958), 221–237, which grew out of research on West African political systems.

[4]*Les Règles de la méthode sociologique* (Paris, 1947), p. 137; quoted by F. X. Sutton, "Social Theory and Comparative Politics" (unpublished paper prepared for a conference under the auspices of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council, Princeton, N.J., June 1955), p. i.

[5]Gunnar Heckscher, *The Study of Comparative Government and Politics* (London, 1957), p. 15. This is the report of a round-table conference on teaching and research in comparative government held by the International Political Science Association in Florence, April, 1954. The book, though based on the reports at Florence, is essentially Heckscher's synthesis.

[6]Roy Macridis, "Interest Groups and the Political System in Comparative Analysis" (paper prepared for a meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, November 1959), p. 9. Professor Macridis gave permission to quote from his draft.

is the dominant one: we want to get at the facts—which we cannot do unless we have some method for ordering them—and beyond that, we would like to make some progress toward pinpointing causality, though there is no general agreement in political science that we either can or ought even to attempt to get at this particularly vexing problem. To these two purposes, some have added a third, the task of ethical evaluation:

> Without some moral ordering of priorities, some hierarchy of values, comparisons are as insipid as food that is served without seasoning or sauce. In the study of politics it is the taste that counts, since ours is a discipline which belongs with the humanities and has only superficial connections with the physical sciences.[7]

This concern with the connection between theory and practice has produced, in the field of comparative politics, a considerable body of writing on what is wrong with the discipline and how one ought to proceed with research to produce meaningful results. What is the condition of comparative studies in politics today? What is the nature of comparative techniques? Are these techniques and methods appropriate for the study of administration? These are the questions this paper will try to answer.

## HISTORY, POLITICS, AND ADMINISTRATION

The problems and difficulties of comparative studies of politics are not peculiar to that discipline alone:

> Questions concerning the validity of results, the need for hypothesizing, the establishment of a general theory, etc., obviously relate no more to comparative government than to other aspects of political science. In most cases they are common to all social sciences or even to the whole field of humanistic study.[8]

In fact, the issues of comparability in politics merge with the broad philosophical questions concerning the nature of evidence, assumptions about causality, and the like. In particular, questions about evidence (the result of empirical investigations) and the validity of criteria of comparison are at the heart of the current difficulties with comparative studies of politics. It might be useful to see,

[7]Leslie Lipson, The Comparative Method in Political Studies, *Political Quarterly*, 28 (1957), 381.

[8]Heckscher, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

therefore, not only how a closely related discipline such as history approaches the problem of evidence but also how research in administration can gain in scope by perceptive use of the tools and concepts of the historian.

Growing up originally within the bosom of history, political science in recent decades has completely disowned its parent and has sought for explanation in almost all other quarters than in history. The study of public administration, in particular, has taken a firm nonhistoric stance and has only recently come to realize that "history"—social, cultural, economic, political—has a tendency to play tricks with POSDCORB and the scalar principle when applied in Costa Rica and Thailand. This rediscovery of the historical matrix as a dimension of social systems justifies this look at the historian's approach to the problem of evidence.

Since history is not a chronicle, Aron points out, the historian seeks to do more than list facts. He must be able to understand conditions and institutions far removed from his own; he must find out how and why things happened; he must be able to place facts into historical and spatial units, and show how these units developed over a given time span. As Aron put it: "Four questions seem to me to characterize the basic aims of the historian. How did human actors live? Why and how did it happen? What are the historical configurations? What are the patterns of change?"[9]

The immediate question is: what is the relevance of this historical framework for the problem of studying and understanding a political system or an administrative agency? The answer is that any model of politics must be a dynamic one, that will account not only for the interaction of political forces at a given moment, but also for their evolution over longer periods of time.[10] This historical dimension of social research has recently been emphasized by Lipset. He noted that both Radcliffe-Brown and Weber had repeatedly emphasized that there is no conflict between the "historical explanation" of a social system and the one which "is obtained by showing. . . that it is a special exemplification of laws of social psychology and social functioning. The two kinds of

[9]Evidence and Inference in History, *Daedalus*, 87 (Fall, 1958), 15.

[10]Dankwart A. Rustow, New Horizons for Comparative Politics, *World Politics*, 9 (1957), 546–547.

explanation do not conflict but supplement one another."[11] A striking application of this historicultural dimension to the theoretical as well as practical problems of administration has appeared in Sutton's report on his technical assistance experience in Thailand. In this report he stated bluntly:

The solution of present-day problems in Thailand must be undertaken against the backdrop of two...historical facts....In searching for the basic orientation of the Thai bureaucrat in modern times, one must turn to the ancient traditions of Indian thought which condition his responses to the modern challenge.[12]

Reporting on research in field administration now in progress at Yale University, Fesler recently made an equally persuasive case for the place of historical analysis in public administration, and for the relevance of historical studies for research in comparative administration. By examining patterns of French field administration under Philip the Fair at the turn of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Fesler and his associates hope first of all to lay bare the patterns of change in a particular national system of administration. Beyond that they suggest that historical studies of administration will add to the number of cases which could be used for discerning relationships among variables and for formulating general hypotheses. Finally, they believe that the early historic stages of Western administration might be relevant to the administrative problems of contemporary underdeveloped countries.[13]

To this list of recent voices calling for a renewed emphasis on the historic dimension in the comparative study of administration should be added that of S. N. Eisenstadt.[14] His examination of

[11]Seymour Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, *American Political Science Review,* 53 (1959), 85, n. 32.

[12]Joseph L. Sutton, "Culture and Technical Assistance" (Paper delivered to the 1959 meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1959), p. 2.

[13]James W. Fesler, "Patterns of Field Administration" (delivered at the Eastern Administrators Conference, American Society for Public Administration, Pittsburgh, December 1959).

[14]Political Struggles in Bureaucratic Societies, *World Politics,* 9 (Oct. 1956), 15–36; and Internal Contradictions in Bureaucratic Polities, *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* 1 (1958), 58–75.

historic bureaucratic systems has already produced valuable insights into two problems which, though perhaps no longer relevant to the modern Western world, remain crucial for the bureaucratic systems of transitional societies in Asia and Africa. The problems analyzed by Eisenstadt of legitimation and the political struggle within bureaucratic systems seem to be basic issues facing Thailand, Ghana, Pakistan, the Philippines, and the like, judging from the reports about these countries by Riggs, Pye, Apter, Braibanti, and others.[15]

## DEVELOPMENT OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Dissatisfaction with the state of comparative politics dates essentially from the publication of the Evanston Summer Seminar Report in 1953. There the discipline was criticized for being merely descriptive, limited to Western Europe, static, and not really comparative at all. This catalog of shortcomings grew rapidly in succeeding years, and proposals for improvement followed one another in quick succession. It might have appeared to some that this wealth of ideas reflected great riches and scope for experimentation in material that could be viewed from such a number of angles. On the other hand, one might have concluded with Leslie Lipson that this diversity of treatment simply reflected a profound confusion over objectives and methods in political science.[16] How, then, did comparative politics develop and what is its present status?

Sigmund Neumann discerned three stages in the development of comparative politics and thereby provided a historical analysis of the discipline which throws much light on the development of public administration as well: rationalist idealism, material posi-

[15]See for example Fred Riggs, "A Paradoxical Model and Financial Administration" (Bloomington, Ind., 1959; mimeo.); Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization" (Cambridge, Mass., 1959; mimeo.); Ralph Braibanti, The Civil Service of Pakistan, *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 58 (Spring 1959), 258–304; and David E. Apter and Robert A. Lystad, "Bureaucracy, Party, and Constitutional Democracy: An Examination of Political Role Systems in Ghana," in *Transition in Africa: Studies in Political Adaptation* by Gwendolyn M. Carter and William O. Brown, eds. (Boston University African Research and Studies Program, African Research Studies No. 1; Boston, 1958), pp. 16–43.

[16]Lipson, *op. cit.*, p. 373.

tivism, and realism with vision.[17] At the present juncture, comparative politics is at the "realism with vision" stage and has a twofold character: it is impressed with the complexity of politics and has taken seriously the warning against easy generalization, but it has also recognized that mere fact finding is not enough. He sees three characteristics of this new phase of comparative politics:

> An emphasis on dynamic processes, coupled with a rediscovery of the discipline's forgotten responsibility for policy decisions; a desire for integration of the social sciences, dictated by a prevailing multi-causal approach to an entangled, intricate, reality; and, as a consequence of the radical transformation around us, a new summons to a theoretical reorientation of the whole field. The emergence of these three trends is particularly evident in the field of comparative politics.[18]

He closes with the warning that the mass of data will fall into a conceivable pattern only if "seen through the controlled order of a conceptual framework. . . . Hence a conceptualization of politics must be a constantly renewed effort."[19]

"Dynamic processes," "policy decisions," "multi-causal approach," and "theoretical reorientation" are terms used widely, if sometimes too loosely, when discussion turns to the present state of studies in public administration. There is a general feeling in comparative politics as well as in comparative administration that progress will depend on finding new methods and concepts, which will help us collect, order, and interpret the mass of data confronting us.

## MODELS AND COMPARATIVE METHODS

This search for a "conceptual framework,"[20] which has dominated the current literature of comparative politics, stems from the desire to transcend the limitations imposed by a narrow, parochial, noncomparative, static, descriptive, and monographic

[17]Comparative Politics: A Half-Century Appraisal, *Journal of Politics*, 19 (1957), 369–390.

[18]*Ibid.*, p. 383. [19]*Ibid.*, p. 388.

[20]Those at the Florence round table stated unequivocally: "A minimum requirement for comparison is that it should be based at least on a 'conceptual framework,' that is, a number of conscious and consciously interrelated concepts which are applied to the cases brought into comparison" (Heckscher, *op. cit.*, p. 69).

method.[21] Students in comparative administration whose horizons were pushed back by the needs of the United States and the United Nations in overseas operations, and whose work was hampered by the same limitations as those of comparative politics, began to look for help (especially for studies cutting across several cultures) to this methodological literature in comparative politics. Here methodological frameworks, conceptual models, configurative schemes, institutional and/or functional approaches confronted them in a bewildering array. It seemed that any one of these might be a feasible way of doing field research and ordering the data collected. Why was it, that with so many different methods proposed for research, very little research was actually being done on the basis of these very models, schemes, and frameworks?

The principal reason for this gap between conceptualization and research is that the proposed schemes are often constructed on such a gross or macroscopic level that it is impossible to move from them to the level of actual empirical research. These models are elegant, logically self-consistent, but of little help to the researcher in the field. If, by chance, resources are provided to do the research, the findings might very well fit the prescribed model, but there is controversy over whether violence has been done to the "reality" of the social systems under investigation.[22]

In this welter of models, frameworks, schemes, and so on, two broad categories can be discerned. There are, first of all, what can be called the "general system" models, which set up a conceptual scheme for something called a political system or a society to apply to one or several societies. The second category, to be termed a "political culture" scheme starts from the proposition that societies and political systems are so diverse that one must first classify them before one can establish methods for comparison. After examining these two major categories some attention will be given to a number of other studies which have some relevance for comparative administration, although they are not as self-con-

[21]Roy Macridis, *The Study of Comparative Government* (Doubleday Short Studies in Political Science, No. 21; Garden City, 1955), ch. i.

[22]See for instance Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (Glencoe, 1958).

sciously methodological as the "general system" and the "political culture" literature.

Before undertaking this examination it might be well to dispose rather quickly of certain writings which deal with methodological problems in a way that makes them only moderately useful for comparative administration. One of these is the report about the Florence meeting of the International Political Science Association written by Gunnar Heckscher, *The Study of Comparative Government and Politics.*[23] This book, as well as the opening sections of Macridis' *The Study of Comparative Government,*[24] and Neumann's historical analysis[25] are useful chiefly because they give a good account of the past and present status of comparative politics and explore certain ways of doing comparative studies. The Florence report distinguishes between the configurative approach, of which area studies are a prime example, on the one hand, and institutional and functional comparisons on the other. In a series of chapters the report explores first area studies and then a number of institutional and functional problems, including nationalized industries, democratic control of foreign policy, political parties, and others.

Another of these methodological Baedekers is Maurice Duverger's *Méthodes de la science politique,*[26] almost one-third of which is devoted to a section called "Comparison and Systematization." Like the Florence report Duverger distinguishes between institutional and functional comparisons, but seems to be more aware than the Florence group of the context—geographical, cultural, and so on—in which politics operates. His suggestion that one divide comparative studies into those dealing with "narrow-range" and "wide-range" problems is similar to one of the proposals of the Evanston Seminar. Finally, he describes a method he calls "viewing a single phenomenon from several points of view." It is difficult to determine what this method is beyond a general encouragement to take as many factors as possible into account when studying a single phenomenon, or an admonition to "be prudent."

[23]See note 5.
[24]Pages 1–33.
[25]*Op. cit.*
[26]Paris, 1959.

Undoubtedly the researcher in public administration will get a greater awareness of the broader political matrix in which administration operates and he will be a little more sophisticated about his research, but he will not gain much direct help from these methodological surveys.

## "GENERAL SYSTEM" MODELS

The "general system" method, operating at the most macroscopic level of generalization ought to be based on a general theory of politics, though most of the writers in this group avoid this particular problem. David Easton, following up his work in *The Political System*[27] recognizes the need for such a general theory, but denies that there is a royal road to it. Rather, he suggests that several approaches are possible and indicates that "system theory, with its sensitivity to the input-output exchange between a system and its setting offers a fruitful approach."[28]

Defining politics as making and executing authoritative decisions for a society, Easton proposes that political life be separated, for purposes of analysis, from the rest of social activity and that it be seen as a system which takes in inputs in the form of demands and support and produces outputs in the form of policies and decisions. In any political system scarcity prevails with regard to most things people want; therefore not all demands can possibly be met. We must determine first how demands arise and assume their particular character in society, and then how these demands are transformed into issues or inputs. However, in order to keep going a political system also needs inputs in the form of support. The main reason for focusing attention on support as a crucial input is the need to find out how systems manage to maintain a steady flow of inputs without which the system would not absorb sufficient energy from its members to be able to convert demands into decisions and policies, i.e. outputs.

This input-output model of Easton's is probably the most generalized of the "general system" experimental models produced in recent years. However, others operate on levels only slightly less

[27]New York, 1953.

[28]Easton, An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems, *World Politics*, 9 (1957), 400.

abstract, and of these, four will be presented: two by Macridis, one by Apter, and the one suggested by the Evanston Seminar.

After reviewing a number of alternative approaches to the problem of comparative method, including the problem approach, a "checklist of politics," and area studies, the Evanston Seminar[29] suggested as their preferred solution a "conceptual scheme" which they claimed would aid in classifying data for empirical research and for hypothesizing. Although the members of the Evanston Seminar insisted that conceptualization was needed at all levels of abstraction, from the modest single-problem one to the global level, the model produced by the Seminar was clearly of the "general system" type and open to the same criticisms as all the other models in that category.

The Evanston seminar started with the assertion that politics is a universally discoverable function, which provides society with decisions having the force and status of legitimacy, that is to say, politics enforces decisions against deviationists and sees to it that they are obeyed. Machinery also exists that enjoys the monopoly of legitimate authority, whose exercise is justified by the legitimacy myth. The political process is, therefore, a struggle between power aspiration and policy aspiration groups for legitimacy status. The outcome of this struggle is determined by the effective power structure, and the end condition, legitimacy, reflects the value system of the society. The tasks involved in analyzing this political system are four. First, the legitimacy myth must be analyzed and related to the general myth structure of society. Second, one must inquire into the political aspirations, political processes, and effective power factors of the political system. Next, the complexity and ultimacy of the decision-making system must be studied. Finally, a theory of change must be elaborated which will account for the tensions between formal and informal processes.

In his first attempt in 1955[30] Macridis constructed a general model, which had four categories of analysis: decision making, power, ideology, and institutions. Under the first category he

[29]Research in Comparative Politics: Report of the Inter-University Summer Seminar on Comparative Politics, Social Science Research Council, *American Political Science Review*, 47 (1953), 641–657.

[30]See note 21.

asked such questions as: who makes the decisions, how are decision makers selected, what are the steps in the deliberative process, and what are the contents of decision? Under the second heading he defined power in terms of authority and identified the instruments of power. Under the third category he inquired after the sources of dominant political ideologies, and under the fourth and final heading he developed criteria for the classification of political institutions.

Macridis' more recent attempt at model building is more sophisticated than his earlier one, but still does not seem to meet the two tests of utility Macridis himself set up for model building: Does it help the student find out what he wants to find out? And, can the question be so formulated as to give an answer in empirical terms, giving the broadest possible meaning to the term "empirical"?

In this more recent model, Macridis defines a political system as "a system of action in which individuals and groups act for the realization of certain objectives that at one and the same time reflect both interest and desire to translate it into authoritative decisions that are binding upon the body politic."[31] We note in this definition both elements of Parsons' sociology, articulated most prominently in comparative politics methodology by Gabriel Almond, and the "authoritative decision-making" definition of the political system of Easton. A political system according to Macridis involves three descriptive categories: a structure of authority and purposes, a social and interest configuration, and a deliberative and decision-making structure which includes political parties and governmental authorities. It seems that both of Macridis' models fail to meet their author's own tests of utility.

Apter, whose work Macridis acknowledged in his more recent model, distinguishes three dimensions for comparative research: social stratification, political groups, and government.[32] In the analysis of the social stratification system several questions must be asked: how are roles defined; what are the institutionalized criteria of stratification—economic, political, religious, and so on;

[31]Macridis, "Interest Groups and the Political System in Comparative Analysis," p. 16.

[32]Apter, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

and what are the recruitment patterns into the major groups of the system? Government is defined as referring to a concrete group; it is the most generalized membership unit possessing defined responsibility for the maintenance of the system of which it is a part and which has a practical monopoly of coercive powers. Whatever empirical form a government will take it has certain structural requisites (authoritative decision making, accountability and consent, coercion and punishment, resource determination and allocation, and political recruitment and role assignment) as well as a certain format (dictatorial, oligarchical, indirectly or directly representative). Finally, Apter deals with political groups and the structure of their membership and leadership, which he considers to be the chief agents for modifying the stratification system.

Although social stratification, groups, and government seem to be discrete categories for analysis, Apter must continually adjust for two factors: (1) the setting in which each system operates, and (2) the manner in which the three dimensions continually impinge on each other and seemingly change continuously under analysis. "The impulses thus deriving from types of political group leadership strongly affect the way in which both government format and social stratification will be manifested in society." And again: "Such leadership reflects ideological positions which range in their degree of commitment to the social stratification system."[33]

The distinction between Apter and many of the other recent model builders is his rediscovery of government as the central element of his system. Government is viewed as a maximizer, "sending out streams of satisfactions"; it plays a "crucial and strategic role. . . in a going social system." Although Apter makes a passing acknowledgement to Easton and his input-output scheme, the strongest influence on Apter is to be sought in Parsons' sociology which he acknowledged in his earlier work, *The Goldcoast in Transition*.[34]

It might be well to comment briefly on certain aspects of Duverger's *Méthodes de la science politique*. In the final chapter of the work, devoted to "Systematization" Duverger discusses forms of general systematization which he calls global schemes or cos-

[33] *Ibid.*, pp. 221, 227.

[34] Princeton, 1955.

*Table 1.* Suggested Schemes for Comparative Analysis.*

| Evanston Seminar | Macridis I | Apter | Macridis II |
|---|---|---|---|
| Legitimacy myth | Ideology | | |
| Power | Power | Social stratification | Authority and purpose |
| Decision making | Decision making | Government | Deliberation and decision making |
| Theory of change | | | |
| | Institutions | | |
| | | Political groups | Interest configuration |

*The models on which this chart is based are identified in footnotes 29 (Evanston Seminar), 21 (Macridis I), 3 (Apter), and 6 (Macridis II). On the whole, an attempt has been made to place comparable dimensions on the same horizontal line.

mogonies. Disposing quickly of existing schemes, he calls for the creation of a new cosmogony but not without insisting that such a new order could not begin from a *tabula rasa* but would have to seek to integrate the older cosmogonies in an orderly manner. Duverger never produces this new cosmogony; like Easton he talks about a general theory of politics in the last few pages of his book, but does no more than exhort future generations of social scientists.

## "POLITICAL CULTURE" MODELS

The "general system" models discussed above have a common failing—their remoteness from empirical research. They need, as Sutton has pointed out,[35] to be combined with a classification of societies and political systems, if they are to be made operational for comparative administration. A number of these classifications have been developed, of which the best is Almond's "political culture" scheme.[36]

Almond begins his classification of political systems with a series of definitions: a "role" is that organized sector of an actor's orientation that constitutes his participation in the interactive process,

[35]F. X. Sutton, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

[36]Comparative Political Systems, *Journal of Politics,* 18 (1956), 391–409.

and a "system" is an ensemble or a "structure" of roles. Finally, Almond defines "political" with Weber as the legitimate monopoly of physical coercion over a given territory or population. A "political system" is, therefore, "the patterned interaction of roles affecting decisions backed up by the threat of physical compulsion."

However, every political system is imbedded in a particular pattern of orientation to political action, in what Almond calls a "political culture." In some instances several political systems share a common political culture (as in the United States and Great Britain), while in others a single country may contain several political cultures, each of which extends beyond the boundaries of that one country (as in Central Europe).

Almond outlines four political cultures into which the political systems operating in the world today can be divided: (1) the Anglo-American (including several of the Commonwealth countries); (2) the Continental European (excluding Scandinavia and the Low Countries, whose political culture is midway between the Anglo-American and the Continental European); (3) the preindustrial and partially industrial (outside Europe and North America); and (4) the totalitarian.

The Anglo-American political systems have a homogeneous, secular political culture, which is rational, experimental, and based on bargaining. The role structure in this political culture is highly differentiated, manifest, organized, bureaucratic, and functionally stable. There is a complex division of labor and a high degree of diffusion of power and influence.

The preindustrial political culture contains at least three subcultures: a Western, a non-Western, and a charismatic political culture. The latter results from the need to cope with the violence produced by the impact of Western rational on traditional systems. As to the role structure, there is a relatively low degree of structural differentiation and a high degree of substitutability of roles.

The political culture of totalitarian systems, though not completely nonconsensual, is a combination of conformity and apathy —something the historic tyrannies failed to achieve, but which was made possible by mass technology and communications. The role structure is influenced by the shapelessness of the totalitarian

regime: the individual is completely atomized, and the lack of a stable delegation of power concentrates ultimate control in the top layer, the totalitarian party. Coercive roles predominate and there is a functional instability of the power roles in party, army, bureaucracy, and the like.

Finally, the continental European political systems are characterized by a fragmented political culture which has resulted from an uneven pattern of development of the three subcultures: the preindustrial, primarily Catholic-oriented component; the older middle-class component concerned with anticlericalism; and the modern industrialized component. There are Western institutions, like parliaments, but the people are not properly oriented to them, and political bargaining deteriorates into "transformism." There is not a unified role structure, and the roles are embedded in the political subculture, constituting separate subsystems of the role structure. As a result, there is a general alienation from the political market. The substitutability of roles is greater than in the Anglo-American culture and there is the ever-present threat of the Caesaristic break-through.

Although a number of attempts have been made to develop political culture models and to design research strategies embodying this concept, they will probably not provide tools for research that will be as useful as those designed by Almond;[37] for actual research needs, they tend to establish a dichotomy between a Western and a non-Western political culture and to assume that all the world's political systems can be subsumed under these categories. The evidence already available clearly contradicts these rigid categories.

The case for the existence of a non-Western political culture has been well stated by Rustow:

The specialist in non-Western politics...will at times be perplexed by many profound differences in the political patterns he encounters.... But a broader view reveals that the impact of the West and of modern

[37]In a preliminary report on his research on Italian bureaucracy Joseph La-Palombara acknowledges his indebtedness to and emphasizes the utility of Almond's "political culture" scheme, The Utility and Limitations of Interest Group Theory in Non-American Field Situations, *Journal of Politics,* 22 (1960), 36–37. See also Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of Developing Areas* (Princeton, 1960).

industrial civilization has resulted in similarities both in the cultural and the socio-economic setting and in the political process itself.[38]

Rustow himself, Pye, and a group of political scientists suggesting a research strategy for non-Western politics have contributed significantly to the drawing of the outline of a non-Western political system.[39] The cultural and socioeconomic setting of these non-Western systems is characterized by a concern with the problems of economic development and the closely related problem of administrative inexperience, which tends to hamper and retard the rate of growth considered essential by the new nations. This desire to develop economically is, in turn, part of a larger complex of attitudes which can be summed up by the term "insecure nationalism." This feeling of insecurity is heightened by the present hazards of the international scene caused by the cold war. Finally, there is a strong cultural ambivalence in many of these non-Western societies: hatred as well as admiration of the West, eager emulation and indignant rejection of Western ways.

The political process which has developed in this setting may be characterized thus: the political sphere is not sharply differentiated from the remainder of the society. As a result there are few explicitly organized interest groups with functionally specific roles, political actors have less clearly defined and functionally specific roles, and there is a high degree of substitutability of roles. There is further a lack of consensus about legitimate forms and purposes of political action. As a result parties and aspiring elites take on a *Weltanschauung* character, easily turning into revolutionary movements, and resorting to revolutionary action because they do not trust the other participants in the political process to honor the ostensible rules of the game. This failure of consensus gives rise to charismatic leaders and helps strengthen the affective or expressive aspect of politics at the expense of the problem-solving or public policy aspect of politics. Third, many of the emerging non-Western polities are culturally, racially, linguistically and otherwise heter-

[38]Rustow, *op. cit.*, p. 537.

[39]Rustow, *op. cit.*; Lucian W. Pye, The Non-Western Political Process, *Journal of Politics*, 20 (1958), 468–486; and George McT. Kahin, Guy J. Pauker, and Lucian W. Pye, Comparative Politics of Non-Western Countries, *American Political Science Review*, 49 (1955), 1024–1027.

ogeneous. Usually, a number of autonomous communities exist within the political boundaries of the new state, and a poor communications network intensifies their separateness. Finally, in these rapidly developing communities there is a high rate of recruitment of new elements into politics. The political leadership often is very young, and there are sharp generational differences between them and the older leadership who fought the struggle for independence from colonial rule and is more deeply attached to Western traditions.

It is very illuminating to compare this model of the non-Western political process with a research strategy proposal for western European politics. First of all, there is an existing body of research results which drew strong criticism from the research strategy group: "The legal-historical-philosophical approach...is not by itself adequate to discover how serious these cleavages and alienations are, for by admission the basic problems of civic loyalty and political cohesion lie in large part outside the formal governmental framework."[40] It would seem that consensus, which the non-Western analysts considered a most important concern, had received little attention.

The research needs in western European government and politics identified by the group making the report were as follows: studies of legal institutions and processes about which nothing is known at all today, studies of the actual functioning of governmental institutions, and studies into nonlegal institutions and processes.

While the emphasis in the non-Western world is on social organisms and patterns of action, in the West nonlegal institutions are listed last as a type of research needed. This discrepancy is further emphasized by the research approaches recommended for western European politics: historical studies, institutional studies, process studies of public policy decisions, attitude studies, and community studies. Again we note the emphasis on formal governmental institutions and processes in western European political research.

[40]Gabriel A. Almond, Taylor Cole, and Roy Macridis, A Suggested Research Strategy in Western European Government and Politics, *American Political Science Review*, 49 (1955), 1043.

## SOME ADDITIONAL TOOLS

Before undertaking a general evaluation of the methodological approaches analyzed in the preceding pages, other tools for comparative studies developed in recent years deserve some attention. One of these was fashioned by the team of social scientists who participated in the RADIR (Revolution and the Development of International Relations) project at Stanford University. Two of the RADIR monographs proposed methods for a comparative study of elites and of symbols.[41] In one, RADIR set out to collect data on elites under four headings: origins (social, political, economic, and so forth); skills (symbol, violence, or bargaining specialists); accountability (to whom *do* the elites listen); and perspectives (how do elites view the world and what might be their code of action based on this world view?). On the basis of this evidence RADIR then proposed several hypotheses about elites and elite behavior. In essence, this is a "general system" approach, but by focusing more narrowly on elites, rather than on entire social systems, it should be useful in the study of administrative elites. Unfortunately, subsequent publications under the RADIR project did not meet the high expectations aroused by the earlier policy papers, and the entire project seems to have been discontinued.

Keeping in mind Sutton's admonition that Thai bureaucrats could be understood only against the background of Buddhism, one might take a look at the RADIR proposal to develop a comparative study of symbols. In the introductory volume of the symbol studies series Lasswell, Lerner, and Pool viewed myth as a means of creating solidarity and proposed to ask: what circumstances lead to the rejection of a myth and its replacement by another myth, and how can myth be transmitted successfully? They conclude that myths will be abandoned if adherents experience deprivation under it and that a new myth will be presented and be accepted. Again, by focusing on a specific phenomenon,

[41]Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and C. Easton Rothwell, *The Comparative Study of Elites: An Introduction and Bibliography* (Hoover Institute Studies, Series B: Elites, No. 1; Stanford, 1952); and Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and Ithiel de Sola Pool, *The Comparative Study of Symbols: An Introduction* (Hoover Institute Studies, Series C: Symbols, No. 1; Stanford, 1952).

like myths, it might be possible to develop an understanding of similarities and differences in myth structures and thereby further the comparative studies of political systems or administrative structures or functions.

One of the methods proposed by RADIR for the comparative study of the symbols which make up a myth is latent structure analysis, which is described as "a method for solving the problem of inference from manifest (observed) data to latent structures (nonobserved continua)."[42] The usefulness of this technique for comparative study has been illustrated recently by Lerner in the study of the transition process in the Middle East, in which the countries of this region were ranked "traditional" to "transitional" to "modern" based on findings collected through survey research and subjected to latent structure analysis.[43] This is a tool which might easily be used for comparative study of bureaucratic systems of different countries and cultures, or even for comparing different elements within the same bureaucratic system.

In his attempt to determine between which political systems stable expectations of peace would lead to the formation of "security communities" regardless of a possible merger of political institutions, Deutsch developed fourteen tests of integration which he claims will offer "some impersonal and verifiable data for judging how far a given process of political integration has developed, and how formidable a set of obstacles it may still have to surmount at any particular time."[44] These fourteen tests he divided into three broad groups (1) compatibility of autonomous groups; (2) distribution and balance of different ranges of social interaction; and (3) volume and dimensions of interactions within each major range. We have here still another tool with which to isolate certain characteristics of a social and/or political system and which might yield significant variables for the study of administration.

[42]Lasswell *et al., Comparative Study of Symbols,* p. 75.

[43]Lerner, *op. cit.,* reproduces the questionnaire which was administered in the field (Appendix A, pp. 415–433), and provides a methodological statement concerning the use of latent structure analysis (Appendix C, pp. 438–446).

[44]Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and Measurement* (Organizational Behavior Section, Foreign Policy Analysis Project: Foreign Policy Analysis Series No. 2; Princeton, 1953), pp. 37–38. This has been applied by a team of social scientists led by Deutsch in *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton, 1957).

Finally, attention should be called to some efforts at comparative studies using reference group analysis.[45] Sociologists and social psychologists have realized that for a fuller understanding of much of social behavior, one requires a knowledge of the process through which men relate themselves to groups toward whose values they refer their own behavior, and with whom they compare themselves in judging their own situation. This method was used extensively in the studies of the American soldier in the Second World War,[46] but it has also been used to study actions of groups in a number of national communities.[47] Again, one can make no extravagant claims for reference group analysis as a tool in comparative studies, but this tool will certainly be directly applicable to concrete research problems in administration.

In citing the security community study of Deutsch, the RADIR project, and reference group analysis, we make no attempt to give an exhaustive catalogue of comparative research tools available today. The brief descriptions are simply offered to indicate the range of material available to the student of comparative administration, materials he might otherwise have considered far removed from his interests and needs. While the utility of these three tools for comparative administration has already been indicated, there is one caveat: none of these is, by itself, the royal road to comparative studies in politics and administration.

## COMPARATIVE POLITICS AND COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATION

It should be immediately apparent that there is a much closer connection between theory and practice in the "political culture" schemes and some of the other techniques which have been examined in the preceding section than in the "general system" approach. But even here the researcher in comparative administra-

[45]Seymour Martin Lipset and Martin Trow, "Reference Group Theory and Trade Union Wage Policy," in *Common Frontiers of the Social Sciences* by Mirra Komarovsky, ed. (Glencoe, 1957), p. 394.

[46]Samuel A. Stouffer *et al., The American Soldier* (2 vols.; Princeton, 1949).

[47]See for example the study of differential strike rates in the United States, Canada, Sweden, and Great Britain, in Arthur M. Ross and Donald Irwin, Strike Experience in Five Countries, 1927–1947: An Interpretation, *Industrial and Labor Relations Review,* 4 (1951), 323–343, reported in Lipset and Trow, *op. cit.,* p. 401.

tion might insist that he has not been furnished with any tools which will aid him directly. If this analysis seems to be harsh on the theorists, this has not been caused by a personal bias in favor of empirical research and against "general system" theorizing. Nevertheless, it seems that in recent years the model builders either have had no concern with the implementation of their models for research in the field or have constructed models which helped them directly in working with particular political systems but were of little help to other researchers dealing with other societies or political systems. On the other hand, the builders of narrow-gauge models usually dealt with only a single country or political culture. Neither method seemed to produce either data, analyses, or concepts that enriched the general methodological arsenal of comparative study.

There are essentially three criticisms which can be directed against the "general system" models: (1) Their connection with empirical research is very remote, and it is often very difficult to establish this connection at all. (2) Although the "general system" models ought to be based on a general theory of politics, we do not have such a theory at the present time. Apter, for example, establishes three dimensions in his model but finds that it is almost impossible to keep the three separate, even for analytical purposes. It would seem the difficulties he encounters stem directly from the lack of a general theory of politics without which the relationship between these three dimensions (stratification, groups, and government) cannot be defined and dealt with satisfactorily. (3) One of the chief drawbacks of the general system model is the one identified by Francis X. Sutton: the impossibility of approaching all societies with a single conceptualization about social systems. Following Sutton, one wonders whether a model developed for the comparative study of primitive African political systems, as was Apter's, will prove appropriate for western Europe.

But the "general system" models are not totally lacking in utility for research. Their chief attraction is this: given the rapid movement towards industrialization and modernization in many parts of the world, it is conceivable that in the future the political systems of Western and non-Western societies will have more in common than they had in the past. In the future a single model of

a society may yield more useful and more nearly valid results in social research than it does at present.

The "general system" model most relevant for comparative administration is Easton's input-output scheme. It helps us to be aware of the dual character of the administration as both producer and consumer, as most directly concerned with sending out streams of satisfaction, and also with collecting inputs, both for its own use and for processing them into outputs needed by society to keep the system going. The European area specialist in particular has a tendency to take for granted the "neutral" role of the bureaucracy. It would seem that his having to analyze a European administrative system on the basis of an input-output model would force him to point out aspects of bureaucracy usually neglected in the analysis of European public administration.

Leaving aside Easton's input-output proposal, the schematic presentation of the major dimensions of the other four "general system" models presented shows that they all center around a very small number of very general categories. A developmental analysis indicates further that power and decision making (social stratification and government, respectively, in Apter), are dimensions present in all four models, including Macridis' second model, where "authority and purposes" combine ideology and power of his earlier model. The last two models, however, have eliminated specific references to ideology and have instead added "groups" as a dimension of their comparative schemes, acknowledging the growing impact of interest-group analysis in comparative politics. Even Macridis, who denies that there exists a group theory of politics, nevertheless makes interest-group configuration one of the major elements of his most recent model. The arrival of interest groups on the comparative politics scene has a twofold importance for comparative administration. First, it calls attention to the formal and informal roles of interest groups in the administrative process, and, secondly, it facilitates treating the bureaucracy or administration itself as an interest group, participating with other groups in the decision-making process, or recognizing it as a major element of the stratification system.[48]

[48]Macridis, "Interest Groups and the Political System in Comparative Analysis," sec. II, pp. 6–15. LaPalombara is even more outspoken: "...except at a general

This schematic presentation also serves to underline the very general character of the "general system" models. "Power," "decision making," "social stratification" are categories which can do little beyond providing a basic orientation for research. The differences between cultures, or within the same culture between national societies, will, in practice, be very great. The comparative researcher, relying only on these conceptual tools but unfamiliar with the specific cultures or national societies (or tribal systems, as in Africa), will simply not know where to find the determinants of administrative behavior or the administrative process.

The student in comparative administration should not be permitted, however, to bypass this "general system" model literature. In addition to some of the specific advantages indicated above, it will help him become more sensitive to some of the fundamentally similar traits of all social systems and social forces.

One of the principal drawbacks of the "political culture" approach, apart from the previously mentioned tendencies to use oversimplified categories like "Western" and "non-Western," is that these classificatory schemes are essentially static and make no allowance for social or other forms of change. For example, there is considerable evidence that in some of the continental European political systems, the modernized, industrialized segment is becoming the predominant element, pushing the preindustrial and older middle-class components into the background. As a result a profound change in the form and content of politics is in progress in these countries. As the old cleavages disappear, and it has been suggested that they have begun to disappear in France, the bureaucracy, once one of the participants in the conflict between major camps or "spiritual families," will become less a contender in, and object of, political conflict and more a neutral instrument serving a higher-consensus society. Finally, the more detailed the classification of political cultures and the more nearly it fits many existing societies, the less the scheme will serve as a vehicle for generalization based on evidence from a wide variety of sources.

interest group theory does not exist, and...it is necessary to examine comparatively some middle-range propositions about interest groups in order to ascertain if the interest-group focus has any utility at all for the construction of a general theory of politics" *(op. cit.,* p. 30).

Once all bureaucracies have been analyzed in a manner that highlights their unique qualities, the chance for comparisons along some major dimensions will probably have been lost.

The advantages of the "political culture" schemes, however, outweigh their shortcomings: they meet the need for a classification of societies; they are much easier to make operational, though not all the difficulties of this process have been solved; and by defining some of the basic units of the political system and then relating them to the broader political culture, they enable the researcher to investigate the varieties of "roles" and show how these vary from one political culture to another. In this way the researcher remains continually aware of the specific social matrix in which these political institutions and processes operate, and it is this awareness that is lacking in the "general system" schemes and that is responsible for their seeming so abstract to the researcher.

Lipset suggests that it is possible to define certain aspects of a social system in theoretical terms and compare them with similar aspects in other social systems. However, one must always realize that

> complex characteristics of a total system have multivariate causation, and also multivariate consequence, insofar as the characteristics have some degree of autonomy within the system. Bureaucracy and urbanization, as well as democracy, have many causes and consequences.... Thus, in a multivariate system, the focus may be upon any element, and its conditions and consequences may be stated without the implication that we have arrived at a complete theory.[49]

For example, Sutton's analysis of the Thai bureaucracy showed that there was no single factor "causing" the attitudes of Thai bureaucrats.[50]

In his attempt to construct a comparative model for the study of politics, Apter put his finger squarely on the central problem when he insisted that he was not concerned with the basic properties of a system qua system but with the treatment of empirical systems in general through the comparative observation of empirical

[49]Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," *op. cit.*, p. 105.
[50]Sutton, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

systems in particular. In short, he found that handling comparative data at the macroscopic level was a difficult task.[51] On the other hand, the more restricted the model becomes, the more difficult it is to make generally valid observations from it. Furthermore, we can set up narrow-gauge problems only if we already have a well-developed knowledge about several of the political systems under scrutiny—in short, if we already know what we are trying to find out. Is there no way out of this dilemma at the present time?

The author thinks there is. Today the researcher in comparative administration and comparative politics will find a variety of tools which will serve him well if he uses them properly. "General system" models will help clarify certain fundamental traits of social systems but will not yield specific operational concepts for the comparative study of personnel systems and fiscal management. "Political culture" schemes, if their classification is intelligently constructed and based on accurate and reasonably up-to-date information, can be made directly applicable to comparative studies in politics and administration. They should prove especially valuable in formulating inquiries into the problem of bureaucratic responsibility and control. Some of the possible uses for the other tools, mentioned here all too briefly, have already been indicated. There can no longer be any excuse for adding to our already bulging store of unusable and useless data by disregarding the array of methodological aids for research available to us today.

[51] *Op. cit.*, p. 222, n. 4.